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 When AAA Means B : The State of Credit Rating in India 
 
 Abstract   
 
    As in many other countries, India's five year old credit rating industry 
has grown rapidly amidst persistent doubts about the quality of the 
rating service.  This paper evaluates the ratings given by India's leading 
credit rating agency, CRISIL.  We find that CRISIL's ratings are not 
only too liberal by international standards but also internally 
inconsistent.  We argue that to improve the quality of credit rating in 
India, there must be more competition; credit rating must be opened up 
to the private sector; and raters must provide unsolicited ratings.  




Over the last decade, credit rating has developed rapidly in several countries where this service was 
unknown earlier.  To a great extent, this growth has been spurred by the increasing volume of debt 
securities being issued by the corporate sector in these countries.  In India, the first credit rating agency, 
CRISIL (Credit Rating and Information Services of India Limited), was set up a little over five years ago 
and since then credit rating has made rapid strides in terms of the number and value of instruments which 
have been rated.  A second rating agency Investment Information and Credit Rating Agency of India 
Limited (ICRA) was established in 1991 and a third agency is just beginning operations.  In 1992, credit 
rating became mandatory for debt instruments with maturity greater than 18 months.   
 
Nevertheless, a few disturbing features of the credit rating industry remain.  All the rating agencies are in 
the public sector; none of them makes an unsolicited rating; a company which is unhappy with a rating is 
free not to use that rating and to go elsewhere in search of a better rating.  This situation has the built-in 
danger of competitive relaxation of rating standards by all the raters.  The country's central bank, the 
Reserve Bank of India, has recently voiced its concern that such a relaxation of rating norms may already 
be taking place
i.  By contrast, the situation in the US seems to be the oppposite: "There seems to be a 
contest to see who can be more aggressive in downgrading people" says the head of a US bondholders' 
association
ii.  An evaluation of the quality of the credit rating of the Indian rating agencies is, therefore, 
called for.  
 




In general, the methodology to evaluate credit rating of securities involves the study of default risks of 
those securities: for example, Altman (1989, 1990), and Fons and Kimball (1991).  This methodology 
uses information on the default record of securities over extended periods of time to investigate whether 
higher default risk is associated with lower ratings.   Since the history of credit rating in India is too short 
- barely 5 years - this methodology must be ruled out in the Indian context today. 
 
An alternative methodology would be to correlate the yields (YTMs) of the bonds in the secondary 
market with their credit ratings.  In India, corporate bonds are poorly traded and much of the trading 
takes place outside the stock exchange.  As such, the YTMs computed from stock market quotations are 
not reliable. 
 
In this paper, therefore,  we adopt an altogether different approach which is applicable in situations 
where long stretches of historical data are not available.  We base our methodology on the well known 
international evidence that financial ratios are good predictors of default risk (for example, Altman 
(1968) in the US context and Gupta (1983) in the Indian context).  In fact, all rating agencies worldwide 
assert that financial ratios are an important but not the sole input into their ratings.  In the US, it is well 
known that about 75% of the variability both in yield spreads and in ratings is explained by financial 
ratios (see Fisher, 1959; Ang and Patel, 1975; Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979; Martin and Henderson, 1983).  
Intuitively, one would think that while an individual company's rating
iii may be influenced by non 
financial and qualitative factors, these factors tend to cancel out when we look at a larger sample of 
companies. For example, the data in Table 1 shows the median ratios for companies rated in each 
category from AAA to CCC by the US rating agency Standard and Poor (S&P).  It can be seen that for 
companies rated AAA by S&P, the median pretax interest coverage was 10.46, while for CCC rated 
companies this ratio was only 0.09.  It is clear from the table that the S&P ratings have very high  
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discriminatory power: higher rated companies do have significantly better ratios than lower rated ones.  
In fact, each rating category appears to have a distinct profile of financial ratios.   
 
  Table 1 - About Here  
 
We, therefore, decided to examine the discriminatory power of the CRISIL ratings in a similar fashion.  
We used the same ratios for which we presented the S&P data in Table 1.  In India, data on the leased 
assets is not publicly available.  For instance, the fixed charges in the second ratio of Table 1 include 
lease rentals and the permanent capital in the penultimate ratio of the same Table includes leased assets.  
We were, therefore, unable to use these two ratios in our study.  That left us with eight ratios which 
between them cover most of the principal categories of ratios used in credit rating. 
 
Out of the 149 bonds of manufacturing companies rated by CRISIL up to January 1993,  necessary 
financial information was publicly available for only 76.  The principal source of financial data was the 
Key Financial Data on Larger Business Units, January 1993, published by the Centre for Monitoring 
Indian Economy (CMIE), referred to below as the CMIE data.  The CMIE data has been preferred over 
other sources since its data is normalised for various differences of accounting policy and related matters. 
 However, since the CMIE data does not provide a break-up between short term and long term debt, this 
break-up was obtained from the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) directory.  
 
The median value (of the three latest available years) of each ratio were computed for each of the 76 
companies.  While CRISIL classifies companies into several categories and sub-categories, the sample 
size is too small in many of these categories.  We have therefore worked with four broad categories: 
AAA, AA, A and <A. For each of these categories, Table 2 provides the median ratios of companies 
falling in that category.  The table indicates that the CRISIL ratings have poor discriminatory ability and 
that in many cases, the median ratios are higher for lower rating categories.  The contrast with the neat 
pattern of ratios for the S&P data is quite striking.  In terms of statistical significance,  the ANOVA-F- 
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Test (with the rating as the independent or "treatment" variable and the ratio as the dependent variable) 
was significant at the 5% level for only one ratio out of eight.  Tukey's HSD (Honestly Significant 
Difference) test showed that the only pairwise significant difference even for this ratio was a difference 
between the AAA group and the <A group.  Thus, CRISIL ratings do not seem to communicate much 
objective information in financial terms. 
 
  Table 2 - About Here 
  
At this stage, two alternative hypotheses present themselves.  One is the obvious hypothesis that CRISIL 
is not using financial information meaningfully in its ratings.  The other hypothesis is that, in India, 
companies do not fall into neat clusters on the basis of their ratios; that a company which is excellent on 
one ratio is poor on some other ratio; so that the neat pattern of Table 1 is impossible to achieve 
whatever rating method one may use.  If the second hypothesis were true, one could not really blame 
CRISIL for failing to do the impossible.  We investigated this hypothesis in two ways.  First we looked 
at the correlations between the eight ratios: Table 3 presents the correlation matrix.  It is seen that the 
correlations are generally positive, fairly high and statistically significant.   
 
  Table 3 - About here  
 
This seems to reject the second hypothesis that ratios are unrelated or perversely related to each other; 
but for a more decisive answer, we used a naive rating scheme.  We simply standardized all the ratios by 
transforming them to z-scores to account for origin and scale differences.  We then created a composite 
index for each company by computing the simple average of the eight standardized ratios.  Finally, we 
ranked the companies on the basis of this index and classified them into four rating categories selecting 
as many companies in each rating group as there were in the CRISIL ratings. For example, CRISIL had 
4 companies rated AAA, 26 rated AA and so forth.  Accordingly, we selected the top four companies as 
AAA, the next best 26 as AA and so on.  This gave us our "naive" ratings.   
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Table 4 depicts the result of our naive rating in terms of the median ratios for each rating group.  It is 
immediately apparent that the naive ratings do have strong discriminatory power; in fact, the pattern is 
now as neat as in Table 1.  In statistical terms, the ANOVA-F-Test is significant at the 1% level for all 
the eight ratios.  The Tukey HSD test indicates that in most cases, all the pairwise differences are 
significant except that between A and <A.  We do not for a moment wish to suggest that our naive 
method provides a good rating; using only financial ratios, there are much better ways of rating than the 
simple equally weighted composite index that we have used.  What we wish to assert is that ratios do fall 
into neat clusters even in India and that if CRISIL's ratings do not show such a pattern then there is 
prima facie something wrong with the ratings and not with the ratios. 
 
  Table 4 - About Here  
 
Table 5 shows the cross-tabulation of the 76 companies under the CRISIL rating and our naive rating.  
The chi-square test indicates that there is no statistically significant relationship between the two ratings. 
 
  Table 5 - About here  
 
 
III. AAA Companies: A Closer Look 
 
Short of getting into the rating business ourselves, there is no way we can take a detailed look at all the 
76 companies in the sample and comment upon what an appropriate rating might be for each of them. 
 
Nevertheless, we do think that it is instructive to take a closer look at CRISIL's AAA rating.  This is after 
all the highest rating and a rating agency awards it only with the greatest circumspection.  AAA ratings 
are the ones on which there should not be even a shadow of doubt as the slightest whiff of suspicion  
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would warrant a lower rating.  CRISIL has rated four companies as AAA: Hindustan Ciba Geigy 
Limited (H.CIBA), Indian Petro Chemicals Limited (IPCL), Bajaj Auto Limited (BAJAJ) and Tata Iron 
and Steel Company Limited (TISCO).  Table 6 shows the medians of the eight ratios for these 
companies, and compares them with the medians of the AAA companies of our naive model and of the 
S&P AAA companies.   It is immediately apparent that the CRISIL AAAs are significantly inferior on 
all dimensions. 
 
  Table 6 - About Here  
 
Let us look at the four CRISIL-AAA companies individually.  How do these compare with the S&P 
standards given in Table 1?  In other words, which S&P rating category is each of them closest to in 
terms of its profile of ratios?   In order to answer this question, we rate all these bonds on each of the 
eight ratios with the help of Table 1
iv.  These ratings have been shown in Table 7.  For example, IPCL's 
pretax interest coverage is 1.31 while the S&P medians are 1.87 for B and 0.09 for CCC in Table 1.  
Clearly, on this ratio, IPCL seems to rate closer to B by S&P standards.  Similarly, we have rated each 
company on each ratio and then combined them into an overall rating for the company (assuming equal 
weightage for all ratios) as shown in the last column of Table 7.  
 
  Table 7 - About here 
 
It is seen from Table 7, that all the four CRISIL AAAs fall short of S&P's AAA standards.  In fact two of 
the four are not even in the A range: they are in the lower rungs of the B range with IPCL rating a B and 
TISCO rating a BB!  Even after allowing for the fact that the Indian and the American contexts may not 
be readily comparable, one is still uncomfortable with the fact that the difference in the two standards 
can be up to five grades (from B to AAA)! 
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Rather than compare CRISIL's AAA companies with S&P norms, we can compare these companies with 
the norms implicit in the naive ratings.  This is done in Table 7 which shows that only two of CRISIL's 
four AAA companies rate as AAA by these (naive-model) norms; the other two rate A or lower.  In other 
words, even by Indian standards, the CRISIL ratings are untenable.   
 
In fact, the inconsistency in CRISIL ratings can be seen by looking only at the ratios of the four AAA 
companies.  Would any reasonable person looking at this data agree that bonds of these four companies 
are equally safe?  When CRISIL rates them all AAA, it says that there is nothing to choose between 
them in terms of risk.  According  to CRISIL's definition of its rating symbols:  
 
  "[Bonds] rated AAA are judged to offer highest safety of timely payment of interest and 
principal"  and 
 
  "[Bonds] rated AA are judged to offer high safety of timely payment of interest and principal.  
They differ in safety from AAA issues only marginally". 
 
If its definitions are accepted, by rating all four companies as AAA, CRISIL is saying that they do not 
differ in risk even marginally, since even a marginally lower degree of safety would warrant a rating of 
AA! 
  
In this context, the ratios in Table 7 are really shocking.  IPCL's interest coverage at 1.31 is less than one 
sixth of H.CIBA's 8.56; its funds from operations to long term debt ratio about one fifth, its funds from 
operations to total debt ratio less than one half, and the ratio of capital to long term debt about one half.   
In terms of S&P standards, IPCL rates B while H.CIBA rates an A.  Does CRISIL seriously expect the 
investors to believe that IPCL is not even marginally less safe than H.CIBA?   
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Even as these lines were being written, CRISIL was advertising aggressively (CRISIL is about to 
become the first Rating Agency in the world to shortly make a public issue of equity) with the message
v:  
 
  "You don't have to look at company balance sheets, read industry reports or follow four different 
newspaper viewpoints.  A CRISIL credit rating can give you an insight into how safe your 
investment in a [bond] is." 
 
The advertisement signs off with the motto "Consistency -  Reliability - Leadership".  In the light of our 




In an earlier study (Raghunathan and Varma, 1992) of CRISIL's AAA ratings, we had arrived at results 
similar to that in part III of this paper.  We found then that of the four companies whom CRISIL had 
rated AAA (as of April 1992), three ranked below A under the S&P standards.  We concluded, that, 
prima facie,  the discriminating ability of CRISIL's ratings vis-a-vis risk was limited and therefore the 
significance and usability of the ratings was also limited.  Our paper provoked a lively debate which 
threw up several counter-arguments though many of these had been anticipated in the earlier paper itself. 
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One line of defence against our conclusions is that American (that is, S&P) standards are irrelevant in the 
Indian context.  Only a small part of this study is based on a direct importation of S&P norms to India.  
Yet, we would  strongly argue that international standards do have a broad relevance cutting across 
country boundaries.  Differences in local environment may imply a difference of a grade or so (say, 
AAA to AA), but definitely cannot account for differences of five grades (from AAA to B), spanning a 
range from high investment grade to speculative grade!  Moreover, in the context of the Indian economy 
being liberalized and opened up to world markets, any justification which may have existed for ignoring 
international norms is rapidly diminishing.  
 
Another line of defence for CRISIL is that its rating is based on qualitative factors like competitive 
position, industry picture and management strengths.  The rating reports of CRISIL do talk about such 
factors.  In fact, the Chief Executive of CRISIL emphasised in his interview reacting to our 1992 study 
that rating is a subjective exercise and that they had no apologies to make about it
vi.  However, after 
reading CRISIL's subjective concerns carefully in several rating reports, we find nothing in them which 
would seriously change the conclusions of the analysis based purely on ratios.  If anything, the 
qualitative factors discussed in some of the rating reports seem to strengthen our conclusions. For 
example, the IPCL rating report of CRISIL
vii says:  
 
  "While the MGCC project will result in the company becoming increasingly leveraged, debt 
service coverage and cashflow protection will be sound given the high contribution of the 
proposed product mix.  Critical issues in this context are the ability of the Baroda complex to 
generate the projected profits and cashflows as well as the timely commissioning of the 
MGCC project." 
 
This statement must be viewed in the light of the trend in the coverage ratio (PBIT/INT), which had 
declined from 12.6 in 1986 to 4.1 in 1987.  That the rating remained unchanged until July 1993 is even  
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more surprising in the light of the steady decline in the interest coverage from 2.25 in 1988 to 1.31 in 
1992.   
 
In the light of this, we had wondered in our earlier study (Raghunathan and Varma, 1992) whether the 
AAA rating awarded to IPCL was based more on optimism about the future than on the then current 
reality.  We had pointed out that the AAA rating is supposed to reflect sound financial strength even on 
the most conservative assessment of the future.  CRISIL's own definition claims that for AAA rating  
 
  "... such changes as can be envisaged are most unlikely to affect adversely the fundamentally 
strong position of such issues."   
 
And yet changes did affect adversely, and before long, the fundamentally strong position of three of the 
four issues rated AAA by CRISIL in April 1992!  Between then and January 1993, CRISIL downgraded 
two companies, Ashok Leyland and Tata Chemicals, by two shades, from AAA to AA+; according to 
our earlier study these companies rated BB and BBB by S&P norms.  Moreover, even as this study was 
being completed (August, 1993), a third company, IPCL, lost its rating from AAA to AA - a drop of 
three shades.   Thus only one of the four companies rated AAA by CRISIL last year, continues to retain 
its rating.  
 
Interestingly enough, the Chief Executive of CRISIL declared in one interview in response to our study 
that they were "not evaluating the company's past, for rating is about looking into the future"
viii.  We 




Our study shows that the credit rating being done by CRISIL is deficient on two important counts: 
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a.    CRISIL ratings are far too liberal by international Standards.  What CRISIL rates as AAA will 
usually rate in the BBB range or lower by international standards. 
 
b.    There is very little internal consistency in the CRISIL ratings.  Companies rated in the same 
category by CRISIL span wide range of credit-worthiness.  The lack of discriminatory power 
is such as to rob the rating of much of its meaning. 
 
CRISIL is not only the largest and most experienced of the rating agencies in India, but is also by most 
accounts, the best of the lot.  It can be safely said, therefore, that our conclusions would, in fact, apply to 
the entire Indian credit rating industry.   
 
The important policy issues relate to what can be done to improve the quality of the ratings in India.  It is 
highly instructive to examine the international experience on how rating agencies have been able to 
maintain their well deserved reputation for independence and expertise: 
 
a.    Internationally, most good debt instruments are rated by two independent agencies and the 
market tends to follow the lower of the two ratings.   
 
b.    The rating agencies have developed the technique of unsolicited rating.  This is a rating made 
by an agency without being requested or being paid to do so by the issuer.   
 
These two factors have together eliminated the problem of competitive relaxation of norms.  An issuer 
has no incentive to pay for a rating from a lax rating agency because there is a good chance that the strict 
rater would then issue an unsolicited rating and that the market would follow that lower rating.  As stated 
earlier, US raters seem to be indulging in competitive downgrading. 
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In this context, what India needs is greater competition among credit rating agencies, especially from the 
private sector.  Such competition would keep the raters on their toes and help make the ratings more 
meaningful and useful than they are today. 
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Notes 
 
   
i.   The Financial Express, September 15, 1993. 
ii.   Richard Lehman, head of the Bond Investors Association of Miami Lakes, Florida, quoted by 
Lewis (1990).  
iii.  Following standard practice, we treat the rating of a compamy's long term (senior) debt as a rating 
of the company itself. 
iv.  We do not necessarily imply either that S & P uses these ratios as a guide for rating or that they 
would have rated these companies as indicated.  
v.   The Economic Times, September 17, 1993. 
vi.  Business World, 1-14 July 1992, pp 10-11. 
vii.  Crisil CREDITSCAN, March 24, 1988. 
viii.  Business India, June 22-July 5, 1992, pp 97-99  
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Table 1: S&P Three year (1983-85) Median Ratios: Industrial Long Term Debt  
 
S&P Ratio   Short 
Form 
AAA AA  A  BBB BB B  CCC




10.46 8.21  5.33  3.05 2.47    1.87  0.09 
Pre-tax Fixed  
Charge Coverage 
             
Funds from Operations 
to Long-term Debt(%) 
FOLT
D 
3.09 1.18  0.75  0.46 0.27    0.19  0.15 
Funds from Operations 
to Total Debt(%) 
FOTD 1.51  0.84  0.61 0.39  0.23    0.17 0.08 




0.26 0.22  0.18  0.12 0.14    0.12  0.03 
Operating Income 
to Sales (%) 
OISA
LES 
0.19 0.15  0.12  0.10 0.11    0.09  0.11 
Capital to Long 
Term Debt  
LTLE
VER 
11.30 5.30  4.09  3.17 2.35    1.92  1.44 
Capital + 
Short Term Debt 
to Total Debt  
TDLE
VER 
5.60 4.02  3.44  2.94 2.18    1.80  1.39 
Pre-tax Return on 
Permanent Capital  
             




1.34 0.97  0.92  0.77 0.54    0.42  0.24 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
   Definition  of  ratios 
  EBITINT  Earnings Before Interest and Taxes  
divided by Interest 
  FOLTD  (Profit After Tax plus Depreciation)  
divided by Total Debt 
  FOTD  (Profit After Tax plus Depreciation)  
divided by Long Term Debt 
  EBITPC  Earnings Before Interest and Taxes  
divided by (Total Debt plus Networth) 
  OISALES  Operating Income (before depreciation and interest)  
divided by Sales 
  LTLEVER  (Long Term Debt plus Networth) 
divided by Total Debt 
  TDLEVER  (Total Debt plus Networth) 
divided by Total Debt 
 TLLEVER  Networth 
divided by Total Liabilities 
 
Source: Klapper, B (1990), "Rating Corporate Fixed Income Securities", in Kuhn. R.L. Ed. Corporate 
and Municipal Securities, Vol III of the Library of Investment Banking, Homewood, Illinois, 
Dow Jones-Irwin. 
 
Note: Ratios 7, 8 and 10 are in fact reciprocals of the original S & P ratios.  This has been done so that 
for all the ratios higher values indicate higher credit-worthiness.   
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Table 2: Latest Three Year














AAA 3.40    0.27    0.41  0.16 0.21 2.34 2.30   0.44 
AA  2.38    0.40    0.22  0.19 0.16 2.21 1.78   0.33 
A  1.81    0.46    0.20  0.17 0.14 2.36 1.61   0.25 
<A  1.73    0.41    0.13  0.19 0.11 2.63 1.51   0.25 
All  2.07    0.41    0.20  0.18 0.15 2.32 1.63   0.28 
 
*The three year period is mostly 1990, 91 and 92, except where data for 1992 was not available.  In such 
cases, the latest three year period had to be pushed back.  
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FOLTD 
 
0.77   1.00            
FOTD 
 
0.65   0.48   1.00         
EBIT- 
PC 
0.43   0.29   0.53  1.00       
OI- 
SALES 
0.13   0.00   0.20  -0.04  1.00     
LT- 
LEVER 
0.62   0.82   0.28  0.07  -0.13  1.00   
TD- 
LEVER 
0.47   0.28   0.57  0.09  -0.05  0.53  1.00  
TL- 
LEVER 
0.58   0.35   0.45  -0.19  0.27  0.50  0.72   1.00  
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AAA  7.68   2.75   0.56  0.27  0.16  11.86  2.87   0.49 
AA  3.16   0.58   0.36  0.22  0.17  2.67  2.00   0.37 
A  1.81   0.35   0.18  0.16  0.14  2.27  1.56   0.26 
<A  1.37   0.20   0.11  0.15  0.09  1.93  1.48   0.19 
All  2.07   0.41   0.20  0.18  0.15  2.32  1.63   0.28  
 
    21
 
Table 5: Cross-Tabulation of CRISIL and NAIVE Ratings 
 
 Naive  Ratings 






AAA  1    2 1 0 4 
 AA  1    13  11  1  26 
 A  2    9  22  5  38 
  <A  0    2 4 2 8 
 Total  4    26  38  8  76  
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Table 6: Median Ratios For CRISIL, NAIVE and S&P Ratings  
 
   CRISIL  NAIVE  S&P 
 EBITINT  3.40  7.68  10.46 
 FOLTD  0.27  2.75  3.09 
 FOTD  0.41  0.56  1.51 
 EBITPC  0.16  0.27  0.26 
 OISALES  0.21  0.16  0.19 
 LTLEVER  2.34  11.86  11.30 
 TDLEVER  2.30  2.87  5.60 
 TLLEVER  0.44  0.49  1.34  
Table 7: Ratings of CRISIL AAA Bonds Based on S&P Norms 
 




















Ratio  8.56   0.00   0.61  0.28  0.14  0.00  3.20   0.53  
 Naive 
Norms 
AAA  - AAA AAA  A  -  AAA  AAA AAA
 S&P 
Norms 




Ratio  1.31   0.16   0.13  0.12  0.27  1.66  1.54   0.26  
 Naive 
Norms 




B CCC  B/ 
CCC 
BBB AAA  B/CCC  B/CCC  CCC  B
 
BAJAJ 














AA  A  AA/A  AAA AA BB  B  A
 
TISCO 
Ratio  2.38   0.27   0.23  0.11  0.23  2.34  2.20   0.42  
 Naive 
Norms 





BB BB BB BB  AAA  BB  BB  B BB
 